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Due to increased adoption of irrigation and advancements in technology, producers in the 
Mississippi Delta have been unsustainably depleting the water stocks in the Mississippi 
River Valley Alluvial Aquifer (MRVAA).  This research investigates the impacts of 
various regulatory threats uniformly applied to heterogeneously located producers to 
avert further overexploitation of the MRVAA.  If a regulatory threat successfully 
incentivizes reduction of producers’ extraction rates, costly implementation of a binding 
limited-use regulation could be avoided.  Laboratory experiments incorporating the major 
characteristics of the MRVAA were conducted to test two threatened uniform policies, 
limited-use and moratorium.  The main finding of the research is that even with the threat 
of a moratorium, the regulatory trigger point was too lax to result in significantly slowing 









This thesis is dedicated to my parents: 
My beautiful and amazing mother, Susan Marie Wilhelms  
& 




I would like to offer my deepest and most sincere gratitude to those individuals who 
made this thesis a reality through their love, support and help.   
 
Foremost, I would like to express my appreciation to my major professor, Kalyn T. 
Coatney Ph.D.  Thank you for your guidance and unwavering faith as you refined a non-
traditional student into a scholar.  Without your extraordinary wisdom, perseverance, and 
inspiration, none of this would be possible.  Thank you for leaving an everlasting 
footprint on my life. 
 
I owe a sincere thanks to my committee members, Anita M. Chaudhry Ph.D. and James 
N. Barnes Ph.D., whose positivity and support was vital during key moments throughout 
this process. 
 
I am indebted to my cornerstone and best friend, Teresa Miller, who has stood by me, 
given me strength in my times of need, and enough love for an entire lifetime. 
 
Lastly, I would like to acknowledge all the faculty, the staff, as well as past and present 
M.S. graduate students in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Mississippi State 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1 
Effective Management of Common Pool Resources .............................................1 
MRVAA Characteristics and Regulatory Background ...................................4 
II. RESEARCH MOTIVATION .............................................................................13 
Problem Statement ...............................................................................................13 
Research Question .........................................................................................13 
Research Objective ..................................................................................14 
Research Contributions .....................................................................14 
III. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE .......................................................17 
Spatial Externalities .............................................................................................18 
Institutional Governance ...............................................................................20 
IV. CONCEPTUAL MODEL ...................................................................................34 
Generalized Model Development ........................................................................35 
V. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ..............................................................................41 
Experimental Treatments .....................................................................................46 
Experimental Propositions .............................................................................49 
VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS ..................................................................................50 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS............................................................................52 
 
vi 
Extraction Rate Analysis .....................................................................................52 
Treatment Extraction Path Effects .................................................................52 
Water Level Analysis ..........................................................................................62 
Aggregate Ending Water Levels ...................................................................65 
Aggregate Ending Cumulative Profit ..................................................................68 
Summary of Results ............................................................................................70 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................72 
Policy Implications ..............................................................................................73 
Limitations .....................................................................................................74 
Future Research and Extensions ..............................................................75 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 77 
APPENDIX 
A. INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD PROTOCOL APPROVAL AND 




LIST OF TABLES 
1.1 Percent Change in Planted Acres and Recommended Irrigation Application 
for Mississippi’s Top 3 Row Crops .......................................................5 
1.2 MDEQ Water Use Limits and Industry Recommendations for Major 
Agricultural Commodities grown in Mississippi Delta .......................12 
3.1 Chronological order of relevant literature .................................................................24 
5.1 Experimental Parameters to equations 4.5. ...............................................................41 
7.1 Extraction path fixed effects of potential regulation treatment results     
(DFE = 864) .........................................................................................58 
7.2 Row versus column ceteris paribus pairwise extraction comparison 
differences across locations .................................................................60 
7.3 Row versus column limited-use treatment pairwise extraction comparison 
across location ......................................................................................61 
7.4 Row versus column moratorium treatment pairwise extraction comparison 
across location ......................................................................................61 
7.5 Row versus column same location pairwise extraction comparison across 




LIST OF FIGURES 
1.1 Cross-sectional representation of heterogeneous water levels in MRVAA 
over time ................................................................................................7 
1.2 Post-harvest ending MRVAA water levels measured from surface ...........................8 
5.1 Example of the experimental extraction choice screen for position 6 ......................48 
7.1 Each location’s extraction path in no-regulation treatment ......................................54 
7.2 Each location’s extraction path in limited-use treatment ..........................................55 
7.3 Each location’s extraction path in moratorium treatment .........................................56 
7.4 Individual location’s water level path in no-regulation treatment ............................63 
7.5 Individual location’s water level path in limited-use treatment................................64 
7.6 Individual location’s water level path in moratorium treatment ...............................65 
7.7 Average ending water levels across treatments by location .....................................67 
7.8 Aggregate producers’ average ending water levels ..................................................68 
7.9 Average ending cumulative profits across treatments by location ...........................69 
7.10  Aggregate average ending cumulative profit by treatment .......................................70 
A.1 Email providing IRB approval for conducting human experiments .........................82 
A.2 Sample Experimental Session Announcement .........................................................83 
A.3 Sample sign-up sheet ................................................................................................84 
A.4 Informed consent form for participation in research for exempt research ................85 
A.5 Experiment participation payment form ...................................................................86 
A.6 Water game experiment instructions for the baseline treatment ...............................87 
A.7 Experimental regulation addendum for limited-use treatment .................................93 
 
ix 







The increased adoption of irrigation and advancements in technology have led to 
increased crop yields required to meet the ever increasing consumer demand.  However, 
increased irrigation has led to the depletion of numerous aquifers in the United States 
(Smith et al., 2017).  It has long been observed that the water levels of the Mississippi 
River Valley Alluvial Aquifer in the Mississippi Delta (MRVAA) are declining. 
Unsustainable exploitation of aquifers is an important issue for society and government 
agencies with the responsibility to regulate and monitor the sustainable usage of this life 
sustaining natural resource.   The motivation for this study is to analyze the potential 
impacts of a set of government regulatory responses to stem the likelihood of the 
overexploitation of the MRVAA. 
Effective Management of Common Pool Resources 
The MRVAA is best characterized as a common pool resource (CPR).  The 
characteristics of a CPR are subtractability and non-excludability (Ostrom et al., 1993).  
In regards to subtractability, the MRVAA contains groundwater that when extracted by 
an individual, decreases the available groundwater for another producer.  In regards to 
non-excludability, it was not until 1985 that the State of Mississippi required producers to 




Researchers have long debated whether [external] government regulation or 
[internal] self-governance is the most efficient mechanism to avoid over exploitation of 
CPR’s.  In support of government regulation, Hardin (1968) predicted that, without 
government intervention or establishing and enforcing private property rights, complete 
depletion of natural resources is inevitable.  This is commonly referred to as the “Tragedy 
of the Commons”.  The cause of the resource’s destruction is due to the individual user’s 
incentives to maximize personal profit without concern for their impacts on others, and 
hence negatively impacts social welfare.   
Later, Gardner et al. (1997) concludes that under a Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 
entry restrictions may be implemented to reduce rent dissipation and increase average 
efficiency.  Water laws in States that have instituted a Correlative Rights Doctrine 
(Riparian Rights Doctrine) imposing stock quotas limiting the amount of water extracted 
may distinctly improve management performance.  
Other scholars have argued that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is not inevitable 
and that government regulation is not necessarily required at localized levels (e.g., 
Ostrom et al., 1999; Walker & Gardner, 1992; Seabright, 1993).  They insist established 
informal arrangements or traditional customs are viable alternatives to facilitate 
cooperation for sustainable resource management.  Among the relevant literature, the 
four most effective self-governing mechanisms are: non-binding face-to-face 
communication, binding bilateral bargaining, resource allocation through auctions, and an 
imposed sanctioning institution (Ostrom et al., 1993; Walker et al., 2000; Casari & Plott, 
2003; Holt et al., 2012).   
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Lewis & Cowen (1983) establishes five necessary conditions for a cooperative 
solution without the presence of any institutions. 1  Upon further examination of Lewis & 
Cowen’s model, Blomquist & Ostrom (1985) state their assumptions present unrealistic 
conditions.  The authors proceed to describe institutional arrangements that facilitate 
voluntary agreements improving the probability of satisfying each of the five conditions 
to achieve a comparable solution.  
Finally, Ostrom et al. (1999) concluded that a universal solution mechanism for 
resolving every CPR dilemma does not exist.  This is because of heterogeneity pertaining 
to certain CPR characteristics such as: size, scope, and resource dynamics.  Ostrom et al. 
(1999) go on to state that self-governance mechanisms are better suited for management 
of small-scale CPRs with a limited number of producers.  However, large-scale complex 
irrigation systems comprising many producers with separate interests, may require an 
exogenous central authority to prescribe a mechanism benefitting both the producers of 
the resource, as well as the resource itself.  Therefore, any potential solution mechanism 
resolving CPR dilemmas must be evaluated based on its size, number of producers, and 
as well as on its unique physical characteristics of the resource. 
                                                 
1 Information condition assume individuals have complete information about resource characteristics (e.g. 
capacity, growth rate, safe yield, their own and other’s exploitation, total number of producers, and 
incremental differences from defection.  Communication condition assume immediate, perfect, and 
costless communication. A caveat is a positive correlation between the number of producers and 
negotiating and monitoring costs.  Symmetry condition assumes all individuals are homogeneous in 
resource usage, accrued benefits, and equity (fairness).  Enforcement (deterrence) condition assumes the 
deterrent threat to be “everyone defects from their strategy forever if any individual defects once.”  
Monitoring condition assumes perfect and costless monitoring resulting from the information condition.  
All conditions must be satisfied and policed by each respective user to result in an indefinite cooperative 




Given the previous discussion, it appears that the MRVAA may be better 
managed by [external] government regulation due its size and number of potential 
producers.  The MRVAA covers 2,762,236 acres in the Mississippi Delta, of which 
roughly 65 percent of the hectares are irrigated (Kebede et al., 2014).  In 2012, the 
MRVAA has the possibility of serving 7,084 Delta farms.2 
MRVAA Characteristics and Regulatory Background 
The MRVAA is a shallow aquifer with a relatively fast recharge rate, ranging 
from parts of southwestern Arkansas, northeastern part of Louisiana, western border of 
Tennessee, and the northwestern part of Mississippi, known as the ‘Mississippi Delta’ 
(Coupe et al., 2012). The Mississippi Delta’s climate is humid subtropical and receives an 
abundance of average rainfall of more than 130cm, however, only 28% of the rainfall 
occurs during the growing season (Coupe et al., 2012).  Because much of the soils in the 
region are composed of heavy clay, relatively little recharge can be attributed to 
percolation.  Instead, rivers and streams provide most of the recharge from the sides of 
the aquifer. 
The demands on the MRVAA have been increasing over time. Since the 1950’s, 
extraction from the MRVAA has increased in part because of the poor quality (e.g. 
chemicals and sediments) and reliability of the surface water.  Additionally, government 
policies have affected the crop selection in the U.S. and the Mississippi Delta toward 
more water intensive crops.  For instance, the Renewable Fuel Standard Program was 






designed to help combat pollution through the usage of gasoline and reduce foreign 
energy dependence.3  This policy has contributed to rising corn prices, which has led 
many cotton producers to switch to corn.  Table 1.1 displays the percent change in 
planted acres for Mississippi’s top 3 row crops.  As opposed to cotton, the production of 
corn requires significantly higher levels of water. 
Table 1.1 Percent Change in Planted Acres and Recommended Irrigation Application 
for Mississippi’s Top 3 Row Crops  









Soybeans 2,630,000 2,040,000 -22.43 0.9 
Corn 304,000 750,000 +146.71 0.9 




Even though the Delta region receives significant annual precipitation, as 
compared to the Midwest and West, precipitation is the least during the growing seasons 
for most row crops, especially corn.  As such, [Mississippi] Delta producers utilize 
irrigation to combat the uneven seasonal distributions of precipitation (Coupe et al., 
2012). Though stochastic rain events during the growing season helps buffer ground 
water extraction, the rainfall has not proven dependable enough for stable corn 
production. 
The increasing use of ground water for agriculture in the [Mississippi] Delta has 
led to declining water table levels (Coupe et al. 2012).  Figure 1.1 demonstrates two 
                                                 
3 The RFS was enacted under the 2005 Energy Policy Act and expanded within the 2007 
Energy Independence and Security Act (Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 2016).  
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attributes of the MRVAA over time.  First, since the 1950’s, water levels have declined.  
Secondly, the MRVAA exhibits a cross-sectional heterogeneous water levels.  Figure 1.2 
is an area map of the current water level status of the MRVAA.  As can be seen, water 
levels are the lowest in the more central regions. This is often referred to as the ‘cone of 
depression’.   
 The MRVAA is not a static aquifer, but appears to have some flow dynamics.  
From a geo-survey, Coupe et al. (2012) identifies that the MRVAA generally flows from 
north to south. Recharge primarily flows from north to south and bordered by the north-
to-south flowing Mississippi River to the west and the Tallahatchie and Yalobusha rivers 
to the east.  The Sunflower River flows north to south and lies above the central portion 
of the MRVAA where the cone of depression is most prominent.  YMD (2006) make 
note that in recent history the Sunflower River often runs dry during the summer months.   
Because of the spatial and flow dynamics of the MRVAA, producer wells located 
sequentially along the general flow creates an assignment problem.  The cone of 
depression in the MRVAA identifies asymmetrically endowed producers, most likely in 
regards to recharge. Producers located at the northern end of the MRVAA’s natural 















In response to depleting water resources, the state of Mississippi instituted the 
Riparian Rights Doctrine in 1985 (Whittington, 2014).  The adoption of the law gave 
ownership of all public waterbodies to the State.4  By Executive Order No. 1341, 
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) was formed and charged with 
the responsibility to regulate the usage of all surface and groundwater in order to ensure 
maximum sustainable use of the water in the state.  By Mississippi Code Ann. §51-3-1, 
“It is hereby declared that the general welfare of the people of the State of Mississippi 
requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent 
of which they are capable, ….”.  Within Mississippi Code Ann. §49-2-7 and §51-3-1, the 
Commission of Environmental Quality (CEQ) Task Force was established to develop and 
promote actions ensuring future water supplies for long run sustainability within the 
Mississippi Delta.  
Acquisition of permits to use the State’s water are purchased through the 
Environmental Quality Permit Board (EQPB).  Since then, the number of permitted wells 
have risen from 2,823 in 1987 to 19,410 in 2015 in the Mississippi Delta alone (Wood et 
al., 2017).  In economics, this is referred to as the extensive margin.  Until 2016, a well 
permit cost $10 and lasted for 10 years.  Now, permit duration has been reduced to 5 
years.  To which extent EQPB have or currently deny new permits is unknown.   
Currently, in addition to the reduction in permit length, MDEQ mandates row 
crop producers to either install a sprinkler system (e.g. center pivot) or satisfy at least 
three of eleven alternatives within the irrigation water management (IMP) practices 
                                                 
4 Mississippi Code Annotated §§51-3-1 through §§51-3-55 (2004). 
 
10 
guideline.5  Within the IMP are ‘acceptable agricultural water efficiency practices’ 
criteria, and failure to meet these criteria results in rejecting the renewal of a well permit.  
Several recent research publications by the current director of the Water Resource 
Research Institute (WRRI), Dr. Jason Krutz, have demonstrated the economic gains at the 
intensive margin and resource welfare that could be attained through implementation of 
technologies such as soil moisture sensors, computerized hole selection (CHS) for furrow 
irrigation, or surge valves (Beeson & Coblentz, 2014).   
The main method of water application toward row crops is by furrow irrigation 
because of the heavy clay soil which is prevalent in this region.  With the Mississippi 
Delta region as the setting, field studies have been conducted comparing different 
irrigation techniques.  Recently in a field study, Wood et al. (2017) compared this 
region’s current main irrigation technique, conventional continuous flow furrow 
irrigation (CONV), to an advanced irrigation technique known as ‘SURGE’ irrigation.6  
They conclude that any additional installation costs of SURGE is offset by reduced water 
application ranging from 22% – 80%.  Additionally, their results indicate improved 
irrigation water use efficiency (IWUE) of 29% while sustaining equivalent crop yield 
relative to CONV.   
However, recent irrigation technology research (e.g., Peterson & Ding, 2005; 
Pfeiffer & Lin, 2014; Berbel & Mateos, 2014) have stated that advancements in irrigation 
                                                 
5 Refer to 
https://www.deq.state.ms.us/MDEQ.nsf/pdf/L&W_MRVAConservationMethodMDEQApplicationOct16/$
File/MRVA%20Conservation%20Method%20MDEQ%20Application%20Oct%2016.pdf?OpenElement 
for the complete list of ‘acceptable agricultural water efficiency practices for MRVA agricultural 
groundwater withdrawal permits.’ 
6 ‘SURGE’ irrigation improves the uniform distribution of furrow irrigation through irregular cycles or 
intervals thus improving down furrow efficiency while also reducing deep percolation (Henry & Krutz, 
2017)   
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technology has increased groundwater withdrawals thus further depleting water levels in 
aquifers.  That is, decreasing the marginal cost of extraction may lead producers changing 
toward a higher water intensive crop mix (Peterson & Ding, 2005; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2014).  
Therefore, technological advancements in irrigation efficiency may not mitigate the 
depletion of the water level in the aquifer.    
Although the intended outcome may not result, implementing these advancements 
tend to be the most common, effective, and feasible policy prescription utilized to 
encourage more efficient water resource management (Peterson & Ding, 2005; Pfeiffer & 
Lin, 2014; Berbel & Mateos, 2014).  Regulations that restrict groundwater extraction tend 
to be expensive policy prescriptions, which may explain why regulatory agencies 
incentivize adoption of technological advancements in irrigation.  Therefore, to achieve 
the regulator’s goal of increasing the ending water level of the aquifer, increases 
irrigation efficiency must be coupled with reduced quantities of water extraction allowed 
(Pfeiffer & Lin, 2014). 
Furthermore, each permit sets a water use limit for various agricultural production 
(Table 1.2).  This is referred to in the economics literature as the intensive margin.  
However, these limits are roughly twice that of recommended usage by normal 
agricultural practices for any crop in the region (YMD, 2010).  Taking the current 
regulatory constraints on the number of well permits and use limits, it appears that 






Table 1.2 MDEQ Water Use Limits and Industry Recommendations for Major 
Agricultural Commodities grown in Mississippi Delta 
Agricultural Commodity Water Use Limits 
(acre/feet) 










Rice 3.0 2.5 
Aquaculture 5.0 4.0 
Aquaculture (Fingerlings) 7.0 5.3 
Source: http://www.quickstats.nass.usda.gov 
Initially at the start of 2014, MDEQ threatened to mandate metering of all 
permitted wells in the Mississippi Delta.  In response to the threat, an agreement with 
farm groups resulted in 10% of all permitted wells in each county would be metered by 
December 30, 2015.7  Those farmers who voluntarily meter their wells began self-
reporting their water use February 1, 2016 and annually thereafter.   Data from these 
wells are intended to provide better information regarding the state and nature of the 
aquifer.  However, a large sample may be required to provide a relatively accurate ‘map’ 
of the complicated MRVAA’s hydrological flow dynamics, and hence better define 
producers’ relative impacts on others and the aquifer as a whole. 









There exists a tension between water sustainability and economic prosperity in a 
commons property setting.  It appears from the literature that there does not exist a 
universal efficiency enhancing resource management policy for CPR’s.  Current 
regulatory policies on water use in the MRVAA has not stemmed the reduction in the 
water levels, and the adoption of technology and farm practices may not generate the 
desired result of reducing total water usage.    
MDEQ has demonstrated a willingness to increase regulatory oversight in order to 
address their main concern which is the aggregate state of the aquifer.  A growing 
concern among the major farm groups in Mississippi is the implementation of future 
water use regulations (Mckee, 2011; Brandon, 2011).  If adoption of technology and farm 
practices do not stem the declines in the MRVAA, the next regulatory step may be to 
reduce water usage and/or the number of well permits.  However, regulation is likely to 
be costly to effectively implement, due to strategic avoidance by those who are regulated.    
Research Question 
Before imposing a limited use regulation of a CPR, could regulators make use of 




The objective of this study is to investigate the impact on producer water 
extraction behavior in a non-cooperative game under a credible threat of varying degrees 
of future water use restrictions by an external regulatory body.  To achieve the objective, 
laboratory experiments are designed that incorporate three major characteristics of the 
MRVAA, 1) CPR, 2) a directional hydrologic flow dynamic, and 3) heterogeneously 
located (recharge endowed) producers.   
Research Contributions 
The main contributions of the research are both policy and academic relevant.  In 
regards to policy, if the threat is successful, then more sustainable usages could be 
achieved without costly regulation. This study will be the first to characterize the 
interrelationships between producers in MRVAA and identify the common pool dilemma 
confronting Mississippi Delta producers and regulators.   For instance, this is the first 
setting applicable to shallow aquifers with significant flow dynamics, as well as 
heterogeneously recharge endowed producers Also, the research provides the first 
analysis of the relevant strategic issues of regulation in the Mississippi Delta region.  For 
instance, the research informs policy makers of the impacts on heterogeneous user 
strategic behavior and the resulting aggregate impact on the sustainability of the MRVAA 
given various degrees of symmetrically applied water restriction regulations.    
In regards to the academic literature, this study either combines and/or extends 
three dissimilar assumptions from previous CPR analyses by Gardner et al., 1997; Suter 
et al., 2012; and Holt et al., 2012 within the conceptual model.  Gardner et al. (1997) 
assumes homogeneous producers and does not model recharge, Suter et al. (2012) 
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assumes homogeneous recharge rates in a spatially explicit model, and Holt et al. (2012) 
analyzes a surface water setting in the form of a river.  Also differing from previous 
research, this study will analyze impacts on strategic decision making behaviors across 
regulatory treatments within a spatially sequential groundwater extraction setting.    
This study builds on the research Suter et al. (2012) conducted by incorporating a 
natural recharge rate within the model pertinent when accounting for the MRVAA’s flow 
dynamics.  Not until recently have economists built more spatially realistic CPR models 
examining spatial externalities created by sequential resource appropriation (Brozović et 
al., 2006; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2012; Suter et al., 2012).  This study incorporates a similar 
sequential resource appropriation framework to Holt et al. (2012) which is created by a 
unidirectional flow in order to analyze changes to a producer’s strategic decision 
behavior.  This study contributes to the literature by modeling and conducting 
experiments that incorporate this particular hydrologic flow dynamic for groundwater 
extraction in aquifers similar to the MRVAA.  The last contribution of this study is 
evaluating changes in extraction behavior within treatments focusing on a symmetric 
policy either imposing a proportional reduction or complete shutdown of groundwater 
extraction.    
Organization of this research begin with a review of relevant literature in regards 
to externalities and institutional governance.  A conceptual model is then developed that 
incorporates aspects of relevant aquifer flow dynamics for the MRVAA and other 
characteristics from scientific studies.  Next, the experimental design is described.  After 
conducting each experimental treatment and gathering data, all the experimental results 
are reported.  Finally, conclusions will be drawn which address policy implications, 
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REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Common pool resource (CPR) problems have been debated and studied for nearly 
a century.  The complexity encompassing the management of a CPR has led researchers 
from multiple academic disciplines to address CPR dilemmas.  Scott Gordon (1954) 
made the first significant contribution explicitly toward CPR research by establishing the 
first formal model of CPR appropriation analyzing the fishing industry.  Gordon refuted 
previous biological research that indicated market effects were enough to ensure an 
ecosystem equilibrium. However less than a decade later, Garrett Hardin’s seminal work 
states inefficient management of a renewable CPR by economically rational individuals 
will result in total destruction of the resource (1968).  He coins this extreme outcome as a 
“Tragedy of the Commons.”  More recently, Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and her 
collaborators concede while Hardin’s extremely pessimistic outcome is possible, it is not 
only nor the most likely outcome in small-scale localized situations (1990; Walker et al., 
1990; Walker & Gardner, 1992; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993).  
There exists a plethora of CPR research regarding efficient management of 
groundwater irrigation systems, and table 2.1 provides the relevant literature for this 
analysis.  To begin to understand a CPR dilemma, Gardner et al. (1990) specified 
necessary conditions that CPRs must satisfy before being classified as a CPR dilemma.  
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The four conditions8 they specify are as follows: resource subtractability, multiple 
producers, suboptimal outcome, and constitutional feasible alternatives.  Much of the 
groundwater research focuses on one of two following distinct problems created by CPR 
dilemmas: appropriation or provision.  Currently in the Delta region, the MRVAA 
satisfies all necessary conditions9 to be categorized as a CPR dilemma.  The remaining 
relevant literature pertaining to this study will focus on spatial externalities and 
institutional governance to establish how this study contributes toward progressing this 
line of research.  
Spatial Externalities 
Within the field of economics, choices made by individuals or firms generate 
externalities which economists generally categorize as either positive or negative.  
Positive externalities occur when societal profit gains are greater than an individual’s 
profit gains (e.g. technological advances in irrigation techniques result in increased water 
use efficiency thus requiring less water to be extracted).  However, negative externalities 
resulting from an individual’s rational decisions create additional production costs 
experienced by others (e.g. producer’s extraction of groundwater lowers available water 
table level).    
                                                 
8 Resource subtractability is when the resource is extracted by an individual, the resource is not fully 
available to all other individuals.  Multiple producers implies more than one user of the resource.  When 
given aquifer characteristics, technology, rules, markets, and characteristics of producers that strategies of 
the producers, from their perspective, result in suboptimal outcomes.  Constitutionally feasible 
alternatives indicate at least one feasible coordinated strategy exists resulting in higher efficiency than the 
current decisions. (Gardner et al., 1990) 
9 Satisfying only conditions 1 and 2 creates a CPR situation.  In order to differentiate a dilemma from a 
situation, a CPR must also satisfy conditions 3 and 4. (Gardner et al., 1990) 
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Early groundwater analyses (e.g. Gisser & Sanchez, 1980) primarily utilize a 
“single-cell aquifer” model or “bathtub” model which disregards the influence of the 
spatial aspects as well as increases in production cost due to well location (Brozović et 
al., 2010; Suter et al., 2012).  Despite this simplification, it is generally agreed that these 
types of models produce reasonably good estimates for small confined aquifers.  
However, Brozović et al. (2010) state a “single-cell aquifer” model will underestimate the 
magnitude of the groundwater externality around a well by several times or more when 
analyzing large aquifers.  Therefore, since the MRVAA is a large aquifer, a simple 
“single-cell aquifer” model is not applicable.  
Ever since scientists investigated rapid declining water levels primarily in 
concentrated irrigation areas in the 1970’s, spatial externalities has been a contentious 
issue (Pfeiffer & Lin, 2012).  Currently, a growing number of groundwater research 
utilize spatially explicit models.  Although incorporating spatial externalities adds 
another level of complexity to the model, this feature is more closely aligned with the real 
world.  Integrating specific aquifer characteristics, storativity and transmissivity, while 
accounting for time and distance between wells controls for extraction impacts across 
time and space (Brozović et al., 2010; Suter et al., 2012; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2012).10,11 
Previous literature also address congestion and stock externalities that exist 
(Provencher & Burt, 1993; Gardner et al., 1997).  Similar in nature to spatial 
externalities, when well spacing reduce extraction efficiency, congestion externalities are 
                                                 
10 Storativity is the volume of water discharged from storage per unit surface are per unit decrease in the 
hydraulic head (Brozović et al. 2010).  




observed in part to decreases in hydraulic head pressure stemming from a ‘cone of 
depression.’12  A stock externality is realized by producers as the aquifer water table level 
diminishes from extraction which increases extraction costs.  Currently, producers in the 
Mississippi Delta are experiencing both a congestion and stock externality reducing their 
extraction efficiency which impact their independent strategic decision-making 
behaviors.   
Few previous studies model a unidirectional flow dynamic for surface water (i.e. 
rivers) to capture the cumulative external cost experienced by downstream producers 
(Ostrom & Gardner, 1993; Schnier, 2009; Holt et al., 2012).  The unidirectional flow 
directly impacts net benefits accrued and equity on the distribution of water, resulting in 
heterogeneous outcomes based on locational advantages.  Producers at the MRVAA’s 
natural recharge entry point located at the northern end have incentive to extract at higher 
rates because of the increased level of recharge received.  Higher extraction rates result in 
lower recharge allowed to flow downstream therefore, generating wider positional 
inequity. 
Institutional Governance 
Currently, ongoing research debate as to whether self-governance or a centralized 
governance authority (i.e. government regulatory agency) would result in the most 
efficient management of CPRs.  However, there exists differences among the studies 
ranging from the type of aquifer modeled (single-cell, multi-cell, or spatially explicit), 
                                                 




type of framework describing the setting (competitive or cooperative), and assumptions 
about producers.   
Some previous studies tend to support the conclusion by Hardin (1968) that state 
that only a central authority could avoid a ‘tragedy of the commons.’  Previous studies 
have investigated efficiency gains from separate regulatory mechanisms where in the 
absence of self-governance, an exogenous mechanism would improve resource 
efficiency.  For example, Holt et al. (2012) included analysis of alternative self-governing 
mechanisms to measure efficiency gains, but a government imposed optimal tax 
produced the most efficient outcome.  Gardner et al. (1997) reported efficiency gains 
from implementing entry restrictions and stock quotas within water law guidelines.  This 
experimental study supports the conclusions of Gardner et al. (1997) where increased 
efficiency was achieved through a regulatory entity.   
Some previous CPR research, however, support Ostrom’s view that feasible self-
governing alternatives could be implemented to solve CPR dilemmas.  From these 
studies, researchers mainly discuss the following self-governing mechanisms: 
communication (e.g. informal “chat” or bargaining13), establishing water markets, or self-
sanctioning mechanisms.  Holt et al. (2012) also concluded that exogenous intervention is 
not required in some cases when effective mitigation of a CPR dilemma can be achieved 
through informal social agreements.  Therefore, feasible self-governing alternatives 
incentivizing sustainable management of CPRs must be made on a case-by-case basis.   
                                                 
13 Holt et al. (2012) conducted experiments testing these self-governing mechanisms in addition to an 
auction mechanism and an optimal fee.  
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To begin, the relevant literature (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1992; Ostrom & Gardner, 
1993; Provencher & Burt, 1993; Madani & Dinar, 2012) all recommend that self-
governance would improve the efficiency water resource management.  All of these 
studies, however, model a single-cell aquifer.  A single-cell aquifer would simplify the 
model and be sufficient for small confined aquifers.  However, as stated earlier in the 
chapter by Brozović et al. (2010), modeling this type of aquifer would underestimate 
relative impacts from externalities resulting in inefficient policies or self-governance 
mechanisms.  This study is dissimilar from previous literature and contributes to the 
progression of research by not modelling a single-cell aquifer, but rather a particular type 
of spatially explicit model. 
Some literature (e.g., Gardner et al., 1997; Brozović et al., 2006; Madani & Dinar, 
2012; Holt et al., 2012) recommends management from a central authority would 
improve management efficiency.  Out of these studies, Gardner et al. (1997) and 
Brozović et al. (2006) assume homogeneous producers while Madani & Dinar (2012) and 
Holt et al. (2012) both assume heterogeneous producers.  Homogeneous producers may 
have been assumed to simplify the model in order to derive solutions, but it lacks real 
world realities.  Madani & Dinar (2012) would only recommend a central authority if 
caused by natural limitations. The research conducted by Herr et al. (2007) investigates 
resource appropriation efficiency in a static and dynamic scenario.  However, they did 
find that imposing a stock quota has the highest probability of increasing societal welfare.  
Other literature reviewed (e.g., Gisser & Sanchez, 1980; Walker & Gardner, 
1992; Loáiciga, 2004; Brozović et al., 2010; Suter et al., 2012; and Pheiffer & Lin, 2012) 
does not advocate either type of institutional governance.  However, they each outline 
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certain conditions that must be met in order for a policy or self-governance mechanism to 
potentially increase management efficiency.  These conditions include: policies or 
localized management mechanisms must be strictly enforced, the best policies tend not to 
be uniform or symmetric, and property rights that are inefficient or not clearly defined 
and enforced may necessitate internalizing externalities.  However, Ostrom et al. 
concludes no universal solution exists that can be applied to every CPR dilemma which 
she attributes to heterogeneity, in both resource characteristics and resource producers 
(1999).  Therefore, there is not an institutional governance mechanism that can be applied 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The objective of developing the following conceptual model is to guide the 
information and payoff structure for the laboratory experiments.  Though MDEQ has 
continued to increase the number of well permits, the modeling framework holds the 
number of well constant, thus ignoring user decisions regarding the extensive margin.  As 
a result, the only user decisions are in regards to the intensive margin.  User decisions are 
also restricted to a single output, thus alternative crop selection is ignored. 
Previous research conducted by Gardner et al. (1997), Loáiciga (2004), and 
Archetti (2009) model their marginal pumping cost with their cost function from an 
output perspective.  These researchers assume individual producers experience increasing 
marginal pumping costs as a result of continually drilling deeper as water levels decline.  
While appropriate for analyzing deep aquifers such as the Ogallala aquifer, the 
Mississippi River Valley alluvial aquifer (MRVAA) is a shallow aquifer and producers 
are assumed to initially drill their wells to the maximum depth.  This study will capture 
marginal pumping costs of extraction from an input perspective within the production 
function.  Since all producers of the aquifer are at a ‘roughly’ symmetric depth, marginal 
factor costs of pumping are assumed symmetric and constant as water levels decline.  
In regards to aquifer recharge, deep aquifers, such as the Ogallala, may take 
thousands of years to replenish water levels even if extraction ceased (Ponce, 2006).  
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However, shallow aquifers located close to surface water sources, such as the MRVAA, 
has the capability to recharge in a shorter time frame, possibly years (Ponce, 2006).  
Archetti (2009), Gardner et al. (1997), and Loáiciga (2004) all assume symmetric 
recharge to simplify their models in order to identify strategic behavior or other pertinent 
features of the model.  However, recharge rates are likely not symmetric due to 
underground hydraulic conductivity and the location of a well in relation to recharge 
sources and rival extraction (Ponce, 2006; YMD, 2006; Coupe et al., 2012).  Because of 
the heterogeneity of producers based on their locations along the groundwater flow 
dynamics of the MRVAA, this research models asymmetric recharge rates due to 
negative externalities from extraction by upstream rival producers. 
Generalized Model Development 
To begin, it is assumed that [1,..., ]i N producers have symmetric water 
extraction technology and a fixed numeraire number of wells of one.  Therefore, the 
number of producers equals the number of wells.  The competitive ith producer’s T period 
profit function can be generally defined as  
     
0
max , , |  
it
T
it o it it it it
w
P f w C w S dt   I I . (4.1) 
In equation (4.1), oP  is the output price of the crop.  The function  ,itf w I  is the i
th 
producer’s current period’s output where 
itw  represents the producer’s current period 
water extraction applied entirely to crop production, and a vector of other numeraire 
inputs I .  For simplicity it is assumed factors of production are applied in fixed 
proportions.  A classic assumption of competitive firms is that for a unique profit 
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maximization to exist, the firm must experience diminishing returns in production, thus 
 ' 0itf w   and  '' 0itf w  .   This assumption is supported by Barrett and Skogerboe 
(1980) and Kranz et al. (2008) who have demonstrated there exists a ‘maximum 
allowable amount of water’ in order to maximize yields.  Furthermore, any water 
application past this threshold will decrease total yields (drowning out) resulting from 
potential leaching of nutrients which inhibits soil aeration. 
The second term in equation (4.1),  , |it it itC w SI , is the i
th producer’s current 
period’s total input costs of production, conditional on the water (stock) level itS .  The 
marginal factor costs for a competitive firm are  ' 0itC w  and  '' 0itC w  .  Therefore, 
if itS  diminishes over time, the cost of extraction increases and will be discussed 
explicitly below. 
Explicit functional forms used in the experiment are now introduced that satisfy 
the general conditions previously identified.  The profit for any given producer in any 
given period is represented as  
      2 1it o it it it e itP x bw a P S S fw w

         
 
. (4.2) 
In equation (4.2), the ith producer’s total revenue function is,   2o it itP x bw a w  , where 
x is the producer’s dryland output yield.  To insure diminishing returns in production, a 
and b are positive shape parameters.  
The ith producer’s  total cost of production is defined as 
  1it e itP S S fw
 





where eP  is the constant price of energy needed to lift groundwater per foot,
  1 itS S

  identifies a positive water price adjustment factor as water level decline, 
and f  represents the costs of dry land production.  The water price adjustment factor 
accounts for the loss of hydraulic head pressure as water levels decline, thus requiring 
more energy to lift the water.  The motivation to include the water price adjustment factor 
originated from Brozović et al. (2009) and Suter et al. (2012) whose spatially explicit 
models incorporated storativity of an aquifer to account for changes in the hydraulic head 
pressure.  The rate at which extraction cost increases is determined by .  If 1  , this 
results in the marginal factor cost increasing at an increasing rate as itS decreases.  If 
1  , this results in the marginal factor cost increasing at an decreasing rate as itS
decreases. If 1  , this results in a constant marginal factor cost as itS  decreases.  For 
this analysis, 1   and marginal factor costs are constant.  Finnally, the producer’s 
water extraction possibilities in any given period t is bounded set [ ,  ]iiitS S S  where iS  
is the maximum threshold of the aquifer and is assumed symmetric for all producers.   
 Because extraction may exceed recharge rates, water levels may change over 
time.  To specify the hydrological dynamics of stock levels, the equation of motion is 
generally represented as 
  
o
it it it jtS w g w   . (4.3) 
In equation (4.3), the changes in the stock level is a function of the ith producer’s 
extraction rate relative to the recharge rate,  i jtg w  at time t, which is a function of i j  
other producer’s extraction rates.  The externality created in (3) modifies Pheiffer & Lin’s 
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(2012) generalized equation of motion, however, unlike those authors’ model, recharge 
flow dynamics are dependent on upstream producer extractions and do not account for 
recharge gained from percolation.  Holt et al. (2012) assumes a surface water setting 
where downstream producers observe the amount of recharge received after upstream 
extractions.  In an aquifer setting, however, producers make simultaneous decisions and 
cannot directly observe recharge.   Therefore, downstream producers form beliefs about 
their recharge subject to their beliefs of upstream rival extraction decisions.    
If the aquifer has a directional flow, then the ith producer’s recharge rate that 


























where location is a one to one correspondence with the ith producer.  A further 
designation is that the jth producers are only those located in the upper gradient flow of 
the aquifer relative to the ith producer. In (4.4),   is the aquifer’s maximum inflow of 
natural recharge, assumed to exist at only in the upper end of the aquifer.  This would be 
the northern end of the MRVAA and is represented as 1i   designating the first in line to 
receive recharge, and has no up gradient producers.  The second expression in equation 
(4.4) is the cumulative effect on down gradient producers’ recharge rates as a function of 
the extraction of all upper gradient producers.   The numerator, 
jtw , is the multiple of 
the maximum inflow of natural recharge, an assumed symmetric constant recharge factor,
0 1  , and each of  j upper gradient producer extraction rates.  The recharge factor 
allows for some degree of perpendicular seepage unobstructed by upper gradient 
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extraction.  This mimics recharge available from parallel river systems.  If at least one
0jtw   the recharge received by the i
th down gradient producer decreases. The 
denominator, 
ijd , is the distance between the j
th and ith producer’s locations.  Therefore, 
i’s immediate upper gradient neighbor has the greatest negative impact on the ith 
producer’s recharge rate and is consistent with neighboring impacts as in Brozović et al., 
2010; Suter et al., 2012; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2012.  However, it is assumed that the gradient 
flow (pressure) is sufficiently powerful to result in only an ordered effect in this model.  
Taken together, recharge rates for all producers are heterogeneous, whereby the greatest 
recharge is at the upper end of the gradient and the least at the tail end. All else equal, 
water levels decline faster the further an producer is from the recharge source. 
The current value Hamiltonian representation of the competitive producer’s 
problem from utilizing equations (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) can be explicitly defined as 
 
    





max - - 1 - - - - -   




o it it it e it it it
jw
ij
o it it it e it it it
w
w
H P x bw aw w P S S f w i j
d
and







      
 
    

 (4.5) 
In equation (4.5), it represents the costate variable or shadow price of depleting 
groundwater. Unlike Gardner et al. (1997) and Suter et al. (2012), there are no game 
theoretic issues to contend with in this setting as down gradient producer decisions do not 
impact upper gradient producers.  Solutions for each producer is a recursive process 
starting with 1i  .    
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Characterizing the solutions for (4.5) are as follows.  If it is the case that 
*
















  , then 1 0  
o
tS t   
and 0  
o
ktS kt   resulting in 1 0  1t t    and 0  kt kt   , then the problem degenerates 
to a simple non-dynamic profit maximization for those particular producers.  For those 
whose in (4.5) where it is the case that
* ( )  it i jtw g w i kt   , then 0  
o
i ktS it    and 
0  i kt it     and the problem is dynamic. A steady state at time period t   is reached for 
these producers if and when 







The experimental design addresses the MRVAA by controlling for two of its 
major attributes.  The first attribute is the unidirectional flow of the aquifer.  The second 
attribute accounts for asymmetric endowment relative to the producer’s location.   
The experimental design is a discrete approximation of the conceptual decision 
model represented in equations (4.5).  Parameterization of the conceptual model depicted 
in equation (4.5) for the laboratory experimental design is depicted in table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Experimental Parameters to equations 4.5. 
Parameter Parameter Description Parameter Value 
T Time Horizon 
 
50 
oP  Output price 1 
x  Minimum output yield 
(Dryland returns) 
1,000 
b Positive shape parameter 49.95 
a Positive shape parameter 1,000 






Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Parameter Parameter Description Parameter Value 
S  Aquifer’s maximum 
threshold of water 
100 feet 
f  Fixed costs 250 
  Maximum natural recharge 10 
  Symmetric recharge factor 0.015 
 
The resulting Hamiltonians relevant to experimental subject are as follows: 
 
       
  






1 1 1 1 1 1
10 0.015
m 1 1000 49.95 1000 1000 1 100 250
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ax 10
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          
 
      

 (5.1) 
Parameter values were chosen such that a one-shot first period profit maximizing 
extraction rate for position 1 is 
1 10tw  . Because the maximum natural recharge rate is 
110 tw    results in 
*
1 10  tw t  .  Therefore, location 1 would extract at this rate 
throughout T.  Because this will be true for all down gradient producer extraction 
decisions, location 1 provides the baseline comparison for all other producer extraction 
decisions.  Because each session in the following experiment requires less than one hour 
to observe 50 extraction decisions, no controls for subject discounting are measured.     
The experiment in this study examines the decisions of six producers across three 
policy treatments.  Each treatment is replicated six times.   Therefore, a total of 108 
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subjects were recruited from a pool of Mississippi State University undergraduate and 
graduate students through email lists, flyers, and personal invitations.14  All sessions were 
conducted in the Department of Agricultural Economics Experimental Teaching 
Laboratory and did not last more than one hour.    
Upon arrival at the experimental lab, each subject voluntarily gave consent toward 
their experimental participation as well as given a hard copy of the experimental 
instructions.  Refer to Figure A.6 in Appendix A to view the experimental instructions 
that was given to each subject which was also read aloud by the moderator.  Subjects 
were randomly grouped and randomly assigned a location from 1 to 6 within their 
respective grouping.   
Subjects interacted with a computer programmed using z-Tree game development 
software (Fischbacher, 2007) when making extraction decisions.  A historical report (see 
Figure 5.1) constantly updates all producers’ extraction decisions and resulting relative 
impacts (recharge rate, remaining available water level, per period earnings, and a 
running tally of period earnings) after each production period.  Subjects were free to 
choose any extraction rate ranging from 0 to 10, the profit maximizing extraction rate for 
location 1.  However, if subjects choose an extraction rate higher than available water 
within any period, their choice was truncated to the remaining available water level till 
the end of the time horizon.  
                                                 
14 Subject pool came from the following departments: Agricultural Economics, Agronomy, Forestry, 
Wildlife Fisheries & Aquaculture, Economics, and Finance.  
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There was a sixty second time limit to submit extraction choices.  Subjects were 
informed that choosing 0 will result in the minimum output yield (dryland returns) of 
1,000 tokens while choosing 10, the maximum allowable extraction will result in the 
maximum output yield of 6,005 tokens.  If an extraction decision has not been submitted 
by the allotted time, the program entered an extraction decision of 0 for that respective 
time period.  If extraction exceeded the available water level in any respective production 
period, the program entered the extraction of the available water level.  Advancement to 
the next period occurred once all extraction decisions have been made prior to the 
established time limit allows for sessions to be conducted efficiently.  All experimental 
sessions concluded when each subject within their group had made extraction decisions 
for the entire time horizon.      
The role of each experimental subject was that of a producer who decides on the 
quantity of water to extract for application toward their output within each production 
period.  Subjects were informed of the following information.  First, the difference 
between the total value of the output and total costs of production determine each 
producer’s per period earnings.  These per period earnings are impacted by that 
producer’s water extraction rate, the water extraction rates of the upstream producer(s), 
and the history of all producers’ extraction.  At the beginning of each session, subjects 
engage in 5 practice periods to familiarize themselves with the program dynamics.  After 
answering questions, subjects engaged in 50 production periods.   
Subjects were informed about the aquifer’s dynamics.  Because an inverse 
relationship exists between extraction rates and water levels, the change in water level 
depends on the difference between the amount extracted and recharge gained.  Recharge 
 
45 
received, either from the side or from the assumed flow dynamics, will mitigate the rate 
at which the water levels decline.  The producer in location 1 receives the maximum 
allowable recharge of 10 feet because the ordered recharge flow begins in location 1, then 
proceeds downstream to location 6. 
Subjects were informed of the cost dynamics.  When extraction is greater than the 
recharge, water level necessarily declines, however, when recharge is greater than the 
water extracted water levels will increase.  When water levels decline, the required energy 
to lift the groundwater increases because of the loss of hydraulic head pressure, thus 
increasing marginal factor costs.  Therefore, when extraction costs increase, due to 
lowered water levels, producer profit necessarily declines across periods relative to 
revenues across periods. 
Subjects were informed about the impacts on revenue from their extraction 
decisions.  The total earnings for each subject in the experiment equaled the sum of the 
payoffs accrued from each production period and recorded as a fictitious currency called 
“tokens.” The amount in dollars paid out to each subject was calculated by applying a 
disclosed exchange rate of 0.0001 to the sum of tokens earned by subjects within the 
session.  Average payoffs across all treatments ranged from $20 to $30 in addition to a $5 





Each experimental treatment was a different symmetric regulatory policy: no-
regulation, limited-use, and moratorium.  The no-regulation treatment provides the 
experimental baseline in the limited-use regulation treatment, where the restriction is 
triggered when half of the producers’ current period stock levels reach or fall below the 
critically low water level of 5.55 feet.  This critically low water level was derived from 
parameterized simulations where 5.55 feet is the steady state extraction rate for location 
6, the furthest location that represents producers in Sunflower County.  Therefore, all 
producers with remaining water levels above the established critically low stock level, 
will be forced to decrease maximum allowable pumping rates to 5.55 feet. 
 In the limited-use treatment, there exists a credible threat to enact the regulation 
which is a function of the regulator’s (experimenter) authority.  Triggering the limited-
use regulation that restricts the allowable extraction rate to 5.55 feet significantly impacts 
both per period profits and the cumulative profits. When the maximum allowable 
extraction rate has been reduced utilizing the model parameters, results in  6 6t t jtw g w   
which is a steady state for the furthest down gradient producer.  Therefore, when the 
limited-use regulation is enacted, all producers’ reduced extraction rates will result in the 
aquifer replenishing itself gradually over time.  
Theoretic predictions of the payoff function utilizing the model parameters within 
the limited-use treatment beginning in 1t  , resulted in the maximum possible per period 
profit to be 4,759 tokens.  This is 986 tokens less than the one period profit maximum.  
The reduced maximum allowable extraction rate in each period for all producers 
throughout the entire time horizon will result in the maximum potential cumulative profit 
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to be reduced from 287,250 to 237,970 tokens.  Therefore, the aquifer remains at the 
maximum threshold although per period and cumulative profits have been reduced.         
In moratorium treatment, the trigger point is the same but the threat is more 
severe than the limited-use regulation.  Under a moratorium, all individuals discontinue 
extraction and revert to dryland practices where the minimum revenue of 1,000 tokens is 
accrued.  After fixed costs of 250 tokens is subtracted from the revenue, the resulting 
dryland practices earned profit is 750 tokens.   
Due to the restrictive assumptions of the flow dynamics and heterogeneous 
locations of producers, there are no game theoretic interdependencies in the no-regulation 
treatment.  However, in the limited-use and moratorium treatments, all subject extraction 
decisions are interdependent, thus creating a game where one did not exist prior to 
regulation.  Therefore, the advantageous locations, near the recharge entry point, are now 
interdependent on those disadvantageous locations through the credible threat of 
regulation.  
Within each treatment, the experimental design creates a competitive setting 
among six heterogeneously located subjects.  The experimental design for the regulatory 
treatments intend to examine whether regulations incentivize changes in extraction 
behavior provide insight to whether regulations impact those changes through either a 
location effect or a treatment effect.  Any observed significant changes in extraction 
behavior across locations along the directional recharge flow results in a location effect.  
Within each regulatory treatment, any significant changes in observed extraction rates 










   Extraction Choice:  
 
 
                OK 
Figure 5.1 Example of the experimental extraction choice screen for position 6 
  












t e 1t e 2t e 3t e 4t e 5t e 6t g 6 (e jt ) S 6t π 6 t Σπ 6 t
1 10 10 10 10 10 10 6.58 91.79 5662.92 5662.92
2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 10 9.49 89.66 5641.62 11304.53
3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 8.7 8.77 82.92 5511.95 16816.49
4 4.2 4.9 5.3 6.4 8.9 9.4 7.61 73.51 5478.03 22294.52






The purpose of the experimental treatments is to analyze how threatened 
regulatory policies, differing in degrees of severity, impact extraction rate decisions, 
ending water stocks and cumulative producer earnings.  Three regulatory propositions are 
tested.   
Proposition 1:  The threat of imposing future water usage restrictions based on a 
degraded aquifer reduces water use, more so for more severe threats.  Additionally, 
heterogeneously located (endowed) producers respond differently depending on the 
threatened regulatory policy.     
Proposition 2: The threat of imposing future water usage restrictions based on a 
degraded aquifer increases ending aquifer water stocks, more so for more severe threats.  
Additionally, heterogeneously located (endowed) producers’ ending water stocks are 
different depending on the threatened regulatory policy.  
Proposition 3:  The threat of imposing future water usage restrictions based on a 
degraded aquifer decreases cumulative earnings, more so for more severe threats.  
Additionally, heterogeneously located (endowed) producers ending water stocks are 












The empirical analysis first addresses Proposition 1, in regards to extraction 
decisions.  The extraction data collected from the experiment are time series cross-
sectional observations.  The cross sections are a combination of treatment and location. 
The extraction model to be estimated is  
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         , (6.1) 
where 
,i tw  is the dependent variable measuring the average extraction rate from the six 
replications of each treatment for the ith location and tth time period.  Averaging within 
treatment replications mitigates individual subject idiosyncrasies allowing for a stronger 
comparison across treatments and locations.   
In equation (6.1), the parameter  is the intercept that represents the basis of 









 ,  represents 









 , represents the fixed effects of 
implementing the two regulatory treatments.  The notation,








  represents the 
fixed effects of interacting location by each regulatory treatment.   
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The notation, d t , accounts for the time trend in the data.  Finally, since this experimental 
design consists of time series cross-sectional data, the errors,
,i t , are expected to be 
heteroskedastic, contemporaneously correlated, and autoregressive.    
Given the time series cross-sectional attributes of the data, the Parks method is 
employed to account for these disturbance contingencies (Parks, 1967).  The Parks 
method assumes a first-order autoregressive error structure and contemporaneous 
correlation exists between cross sections.  This method requires balanced observations 
between cross sections and the number of cross sections to be less than the number of 
observations.  Given there are 19 cross sections and 50 observations per cross section, the 
data satisfies a balanced panel property requirements of the method.   
In regards to Proposition 1’s heterogeneous extraction responses, any significant 
differences in extraction rates are a result of average learning over time by updating 
beliefs about average rival choices.  Wald tests were conducted testing pairwise 
extraction parameter estimates across locations for the no-regulation, limited-use, and 
moratorium treatments.  Utilizing Wald tests allow for simultaneously testing multiple 
parameter estimates within the econometric model.  Results from the Wald test provide 
additional insight as to whether heterogeneous locations significantly adjust extraction 
behavior, a location effect, or from a symmetric regulatory policy, a treatment effect.   
Finally, regression analysis will not be required for testing Propositions 2 
regarding aggregate ending state of the aquifer or Proposition 3 regarding cumulative 
profits.  Because cumulative results are a simply mathematical aggregation of all 







The experimental results will report observations across each treatment for 
extraction rate behavior, aggregate ending water levels, and aggregate cumulative profits.  
Locational extraction rate and water level paths are graphically depicted across the entire 
time horizon for each treatment.  By averaging across replications of individual subjects, 
any path variabilities in extraction rate behaviors and water levels within treatments is a 
result of a location effect while path variabilities within locations is a result of a treatment 
effect. 
Extraction Rate Analysis 
Treatment Extraction Path Effects 
Extraction rate is the only choice variable in this experiment.  Extraction rate 
governs the direct and indirect impacts on other relevant variables especially for 
downstream locations.  Figures 7.1 – 7.3 depict each heterogeneous subject’s extraction 
path in the baseline, limited-use, and moratorium treatments for the entire time horizon.   
Examination of figures 7.1 – 7.3 shows a high level of “interlocational noise” or 
decision-making variability among all the different producers despite location.  
Intuitively, theoretical optimal control predictions assume that rational producers would 
choose greater early period extraction rates, but decreases extraction rates over time until 
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potentially a steady state extraction rate is reached.  However, unlike the intuitive paths, 
the averaged experimental extraction paths in figures 7.1 – 7.3 display non-monotonic 
decline across each time period. As expected, location 1’s extraction path reflects a fairly 
constant linear extraction path.   
However, the other locations seem to depict a quadratic-shaped extraction path.  
The majority of the down gradient locations display high extraction rates decisions early 
in the time horizon which may be explained by the ‘rule of capture’ from previous water 
resource research.  This assumption states that producers tend to choose high extraction 
rates early on due to the high water levels which results in low pumping costs. 
Reductions in the extraction rate may be attributed to rapid depletion of water 
levels for each downstream location during the middle periods (periods 10 – 30) of the 
time horizon.  Figures 7.2 and 7.3 depict that in addition to increasing pumping costs that 
result from depleting water levels, the credible threat of implementing future regulation 
may have incentivized subjects to reduce their extraction rates.  Therefore, each subject is 
aware of profit reductions per period due to the lowered water levels or implementation 
of a regulatory policy limiting the amount of water that may be extracted.   
Figures 7.1 – 7.3 each show that during time periods 30 – 50, the majority of the 
locations exhibit an uptick or steady increase in extraction rates.  Madani & Dinar (2012) 
best explain this decision phenomenon by stating producers aggressively withdraw the 
resource because any point beyond the end of the time horizon is not considered in the 
decision making process.  Since subjects knew the time horizon consisted of 50 
production cycles, experimental subjects’ extraction decisions may have been impacted 
by the ‘end of period effects’ explained by Madani & Dinar (2012).  Therefore, the 
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econometric model must account and control for quadratic extraction since many of the 
locations’ extraction paths generally display this shape. 
 





















































Figure 7.3 Each location’s extraction path in moratorium treatment 
 
Table 7.1 reports the average extraction rate cross-sections statistical results when 
estimating equation (6.1) occurring over the entire time horizon derived by the Parks 
method estimator.  This econometric model allows differences in the extraction rate 
estimates to be interpreted as intercept shifts or “path shifts” when compared to the 
intercept or position 1 within the no-regulation treatment.  The parameter estimates for 
treatment 2 represent location 1 in the limited-use treatment and treatment 3 represent 
location 1 in the moratorium treatment.  The resulting significant parameter estimates can 
then be used to test the expected propositions where significance can be attributed to 
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locations resulted in significantly lowered shifts in extraction rate paths, but vary as to 
which effect caused significant change.   
When examining location 1’s extraction decisions in the regulatory treatments, 
both yielded significantly higher extraction rate path estimates.  Location 2’s limited-use 
and moratorium interaction terms resulted in significant extraction reductions due to a 
treatment effect.  Table 7.1 shows that both location 3’s extraction estimate in the no-
regulation and limited-use treatments experienced significant reductions.  This indicates 
that location 3 experienced a location effect within the no-regulation treatment and a 
treatment effect within the limited-use treatment.  Further examination of table 7.1 
reveals that locations 4 – 6’s no-regulation extraction estimate resulted in significant 
extraction reductions.  Therefore, the reductions in extraction rates occurring in locations 




Table 7.1 Extraction path fixed effects of potential regulation treatment results     
(DFE = 864) 
Independent Variables 
Y = Extraction Rate 
Parameter Estimate     
(S.E.) 
Intercept 9.37*** 
  (0.35) 
Position 2 -0.26 
  (0.41) 
Position 3 -1.29*** 
  (0.48) 
Position 4 1.81*** 
  (0.61) 
Position 5 -2.20*** 
  (0.58) 
Position 6 -2.62*** 
  (0.40) 
Treatment 2 0.60* 
  (0.36) 
Treatment 3 0.78** 
  (0.33) 
Position 2 | Limited-Use Regulation -1.12** 
  (0.47) 
Position 2 | Moratorium Regulation -1.59*** 
  (0.40) 
Position 3 | Limited-Use Regulation -1.38*** 
  (0.50) 
Position 3 | Moratorium Regulation -0.76 
  (0.53) 
Position 4 | Limited-Use Regulation -0.75 
  (0.73) 
Position 4 | Moratorium Regulation -0.91 
  (0.69) 
Position 5 | Limited-Use Regulation -0.75 
  (0.72) 
Position 5 | Moratorium Regulation -0.68 
  (0.66) 
Position 6 | Limited-Use Regulation -0.53 
  (0.50) 
Position 6 | Moratorium Regulation -0.47 
  (0.58) 
Period -0.09*** 
  (0.01) 
Period 2 0.002*** 
  (0.0002) 
R-Square 0.69 




Wald tests were conducted to analyze any significant changes across locations 
within a specific treatment.  Tables 7.2 – 7.4 exhibit Wald tests matrices of pairwise 
extraction comparisons across locations for the baseline, limited-use, and moratorium 
treatments.  Table 7.5 exhibits a Wald test matrix of the same location’s pairwise 
extraction comparison across the regulatory treatments.  Each value in tables 7.2 – 7.5 
report the row parameter estimate difference versus the column estimate.  Positive values 
indicate increased extraction in the column location’s estimate when compared to the row 
location’s extraction estimate.  Negative values indicate decreases extraction in the 
column location’s estimate when compared to the row location’s extraction estimate.   
Table 7.2 displays pairwise extraction comparisons across locations in the no-
regulation treatment.  Column 1 reports downstream locations’ Wald test parameter 
estimates when compared to location 1.  Excluding location 2, location 1’s no-regulation 
extraction estimate was not only significantly greater but increased when moving further 
away from location 1 within locations 3 – 6.  Column 2 displays that location 2’s no-
regulation extraction estimate was not only significantly greater but the difference 
increased when moving further away from location 2 within locations 3 – 6.  Column 3 
displays that location 3’s no-regulation extraction estimate was also significantly greater 
and the difference increased for locations 5 and 6.  
Table 7.3 displays pairwise extraction comparisons across locations in the 
limited-use treatment.  When compared back to location 1, column 1 displays a 
significant reduction in extraction rates resulting in only locations 2 and 3.  All other 
pairwise comparisons resulted in non-significance.  
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Table 7.4 displays pairwise extraction comparisons across locations within the 
moratorium treatment.  Column 1 compares all locations’ estimates back to location 1 
which results in significantly different extraction rates for locations 2 – 4.  The only other 
significantly different extraction rate within this treatment occurred when comparing 
location 2’s and location 6’s extraction rate.  This is the only pairwise comparison where 
the most down gradient location resulted in a significantly increased difference in 
extraction rate.        
In summary, all the resulting significant pairwise comparison row locations’ 
estimate exhibit decreased extraction rates when compared to the column locations.  In 
tables 7.2 and 7.3, all highly significant pairwise comparison also exhibit increasing 
reductions in location’s extraction rates further away from the compared location.  
However, table 7.4 (moratorium treatment), the significant pairwise comparisons do not 
show this same pattern when compared to location 1, and the furthest location (location 
6) increased extraction when compared to location 2. 
Table 7.2 Row versus column ceteris paribus pairwise extraction comparison 
differences across locations 
 Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 Location 5 Location 6 
Location 1 N/A      
Location 2 0.26 N/A     
Location 3 1.29*** 1.03*** N/A    
Location 4 1.81*** 1.55** 0.52 N/A   
Location 5 2.20*** 1.94*** 0.91** 0.39 N/A  
Location 6 2.62*** 2.36*** 1.33*** 0.81 0.42 N/A 





Table 7.3 Row versus column limited-use treatment pairwise extraction comparison 
across location 
 Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 Location 5 Location 6 
Location 1 N/A      
Location 2 1.72** N/A     
Location 3 1.98** 0.26 N/A    
Location 4 2.41 -0.37 -0.63 N/A   
Location 5 2.80 -0.37 -0.63 0.00 N/A  
Location 6 1.13 -0.59 -0.85 -0.22 -0.22 N/A 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Table 7.4 Row versus column moratorium treatment pairwise extraction comparison 
across location 
 Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Location 4 Location 5 Location 6 
Location 1 N/A      
Location 2 2.37*** N/A     
Location 3 1.54* -0.83 N/A    
Location 4 1.69* -0.68 0.15 N/A   
Location 5 1.46 -0.91 -0.08 -0.23 N/A  
Location 6 1.25 -1.12** -0.29 -0.44 -0.21 N/A 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
Table 7.5 Row versus column same location pairwise extraction comparison across 
regulatory treatment 
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Water Level Analysis 
Some previous research modeled aquifers as a “bathtub” where each location’s 
extraction results in homogeneous reduction in water level.  However, this study 
incorporates a generally uni-directional recharge gradient flow with some localized 
recharge.  Referring back to figure 1.2, location 1 represents an producer in Tunica 
County who is at the initial entry point of the recharge flow received the maximum 
recharge rate of 10 throughout the experiment.  The directional recharge flow dynamic 
then generally proceeds southward where the recharge rates for locations 2 – 6, however, 
is dependent on the cumulative extractions from upstream locations.  Therefore, 
excluding location 1’s received recharge, all other producers’ recharge rates depicts an 
inverse relationship to upstream producers’ extraction rates which is heterogeneous. 
Figures 7.4 – 7.6 depict each producers’ water level paths for each treatment.  The 
red horizontal line at 5.55 feet represents the water level when reached by half of the 
locations, would trigger the implementation of the respective regulation.  Only locations 
2 – 6 will be discussed since location 1’s water level remains constant because their 
recharge received is equivalent to the maximum allowed extraction.  Excluding location 
4, each location’s water level paths under no-regulation show steeper declining water 
levels in the beginning time periods and then again near the end of the time horizon.  
However, the slopes flattens out in the middle periods.  This occurrence can be attributed 
to the shape of the extraction paths in figure 1.2 where high upstream extraction rates 
decrease the recharge rates received downstream.  This necessarily increases the rate at 
which the water levels decline for all downstream locations.   
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When comparing the regulatory treatments to the no-regulation treatment, both 
figures 7.5 and 7.6 depict decreased or flatter water level path slopes from 1 to 40t t  .  
Across both regulatory treatments, although location 1 increased their extraction, location 
2 decreased their extraction.  The reduced extraction of location 2, exhibited by the flatter 
slope, increased the recharge rate received by downstream locations, thus contributing to 
reducing the rate of declining water levels. 
 









































Figure 7.6 Individual location’s water level path in moratorium treatment 
 
Aggregate Ending Water Levels 
A simple mathematical solution of observed effects from the previous period 
water level, recharge received, and the current period extraction rate results in the current 
period water level for each respective location.  Once the recharge rate is known for each 
location, the current period beginning water level can be derived by subtracting the 
previous period extraction from the beginning water level in the previous period and then 
adding the recharge amount received. Each respective location is expected to have 
heterogeneous water levels due to the heterogeneity of their locations. 
The regulator’s main concern is the aggregate ending state of the aquifer.  Each 
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then be aggregated to derive the ending state of the aquifer.  By comparing the aggregate 
ending state of the aquifer in each treatment will allow for a simple t-test to be conducted 
in order to see if threatened regulation results in significant changes in the aggregate 
ending state of the aquifer.  
To begin, figure 7.7 depicts each producer’s ending water level contribution 
toward aggregate water levels for each treatment.  Location 1’s observed water level 
remains constant because     i jt itg w w t  .  Therefore, location 1 will not be discussed 
in this section.  The main focus is focused on ending water levels for down gradient 
locations 2 – 6.  When comparing the no-regulation treatment to the limited-use 
treatment, figure 7.7 shows every location resulted in higher individual ending water 
levels within the limited-use treatment.  However, locations 2 – 4 increased their 
respective ending water levels while locations 5 and 6 resulted in reduced ending water 




Figure 7.7 Average ending water levels across treatments by location 
 
Figure 7.8 exhibits a substantial increase of 85.73 feet in aggregate ending water 
level from a threat of implementing a limited-use policy if critically low water levels are 
reached.  Imposing a moratorium, however, resulted in minimal increase of 11.59 feet in 
aggregate ending water level when compared to the baseline aggregate ending water 
level.  Since regulatory agencies’ principal concern is the aggregate ending state of the 
aquifer, the more effective policy would be the limited-use regulation rather than the 
moratorium because of a higher increase in ending water levels.  Although figure 7.8 
depicts a substantial increase in aggregate ending water levels paired t-test reveal that the 
limited-use to the no-regulation treatment neither regulatory treatments resulted in 














1 2 3 4 5 6
No-Regulation 100.00 28.65 12.24 5.72 11.38 20.14
Limited-Use Regulation 100.00 45.69 42.12 27.03 24.12 24.90
















Figure 7.8 Aggregate producers’ average ending water levels 
 
Aggregate Ending Cumulative Profit 
Figure 7.9 displays individual location’s average ending cumulative profits across 
treatments.  In regards to location 1, since the water level in each period is at the 
maximum threshold coupled with the increased extraction rates, location 1’s ending 
cumulative profits increased with regulation and the severity of the regulation.  Across all 
three treatments, only locations 4 and 5 captured their highest individual ending 
cumulative profits in the no-regulation treatment.  Location 2 was the only location to 
capture their highest individual ending cumulative profits in the limited-use treatment.  
While locations 1, 3, and 6 all saw their highest individual ending cumulative profits 
within the moratorium treatment, locations 1 and 6 saw their respective individual ending 


























Figure 7.9 Average ending cumulative profits across treatments by location 
 
Figure 7.10 depicts the aggregate average ending cumulative profit within each 
treatment.  When comparing the no-regulation treatment to the limited-use treatment, 
individual ending cumulative profits experienced a substantial decrease of 14,389.84 
experimental tokens.  The moratorium treatment, however, resulted in the highest societal 
welfare level overall.  Moratorium increased societal welfare by 1,913.59 tokens 
compared to the baseline treatment, and increased societal welfare by 16,303.43 
compared to the limited-use treatment. 
Figure 7.10 depicts a decrease in aggregate ending cumulative profits when 
comparing the no-regulation treatment with the limited-use treatment.  Although there 
exists a noticeable difference in aggregate ending cumulative profits, paired t-test results 
indicate there were no significant differences in the ending cumulative profits.   
1 2 3 4 5 6
No-Regulation 275199.29 258031.28 239778.25 236765.74 232144.21 222720.46
Limited-Use 279083.35 258750.46 234221.83 233969.1 221220.93 223003.72
























Figure 7.10 Aggregate average ending cumulative profit by treatment 
 
Summary of Results 
Overall, the experimental results indicate that the credible threat of imposing a 
limited-use regulation achieved the objective which was to increase the aggregate ending 
water levels.  By examining figures 7.8 and 7.10, however, there exists an inverse 
relationship between the realized ending water levels and cumulative profits which 
implies more water will reduce cumulative profits.  Further examination of experimental 
results indicate that only the moratorium treatment slightly increased the realized 
aggregate ending economic profits for all producers when compared to the no-regulation 
treatment.  With the exception of locations 2 and 4, all other heterogeneous locations’ 
extracted at the highest rate among the three treatments.  Thus, the increased profits from 
location 1, 3, and 6 outweighed the decreased profits of the other three producers.  Any 


































locations 2 and 4’s decreased appropriation even with the increased extraction from 






The Mississippi Delta has experienced a significant reduction in irrigation water 
stocks over time due to increased extraction rates. This research investigates the impacts 
of various regulatory threats on producer water extraction to avert future over 
exploitation of the MRVAA. If the strategic use of a regulatory threat were to be 
successful in incentivizing producers to reduce their extraction rates, then costly 
implementation of a limited-use regulation could be avoided.  The main finding of the 
research is that even with a draconian policy of complete shutdown, a lax regulatory 
trigger point does not result in significantly slowing over exploitation of the water 
resource. 
This experimental research contributes to CPR literature by developing a 
conceptual model and conducting laboratory experiments that include aquifer dynamics 
relevant to the Mississippi Delta.  Specifically, incorporating a unidirectional recharge 
flow created sequentially ordered spatial externalities.  By adding these setting 
characteristics, this research lends insight into the impacts of locational heterogeneity 
relative to producers in the Mississippi Delta, as well as these types of CPR dilemmas in 




Mississippi Delta producers are legitimately concerned about future 
implementation of regulatory policies regarding allowable quantities of groundwater to 
be extracted.  Presently in the Mississippi Delta, no formal producer coalitions are 
present, but may be formed in hopes to avoid potential implementation of future 
exogenous regulations limiting allowable extracted water. A vast area comprising 
numerous heterogeneous producers creates significant challenges in implementing a self-
governing mechanism (Ostrom et al., 1999).  Additionally, other obstacles hindering 
potential self-governance may include myopic decision strategies and disregarding 
negative externalities passed on to others.  If these coalitions would organize and employ 
an efficient self-governing mechanism, Mississippi Delta producers would avoid future, 
potentially more restrictive, regulatory policies.   
When self-governance is unachievable, an exogenously imposed mechanism 
presents the last feasible alternative.  In response to the reductions in the available 
irrigation water, MDEQ has instituted some incremental regulations.  These regulatory 
changes include the shortening of the well permit life and satisfying the requirements 
within the ‘acceptable agricultural water efficiency practices’ in hopes to incentivize 
more efficient management of the MRVAA.  Maximum allowable extraction for various 
commodities has been implemented, but are not binding or monitored. 
If limited-use regulation is sufficiently costly, regulators utilizing a credible threat 
of regulation may benefit from incentivizing producers to cooperate in reducing water 
usage, thus avoiding the likelihood of the implementation of regulation.  However, 
implementing an efficient regulation that incorporates the hydrological dynamics of the 
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aquifer and producer location is extremely difficult.  In the instant case, the particulars of 
the MRVAA geological structure and flow dynamics are unverified, let alone 
understanding of actual producer interrelationships.  Information regarding these 
uncertainties would allow MDEQ to better understand the current state of the aquifer 
before formulating future regulatory policies.       
Limitations 
 This research acknowledges several limitations within the model development 
and experimental design.  The first limitation involves the lack of a closed form solution 
to the Hamiltonians presented, which would generate a more stringent baseline 
comparator, but only for the no-regulation treatment.  In regards to the game theoretic 
implications of the regulatory threat, previous CPR experiments conclude a derived 
theoretical [Nash] equilibrium does not necessarily guarantee experimental subjects will 
arrive and stabilize at this equilibrium (Walker & Gardner, 1992; Keser & Gardner, 
1999).   
A second limitation regards player information.  Most of the previous studies 
acknowledge varying levels of information impact the strategic behavior in experiments, 
especially non-cooperative frameworks (e.g. Gardner et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1999; Madani 
&Dinar, 2012).  Complete and perfect information in some metrics, as in this research, 
resulted in producers having knowledge of rival costs, relative payoffs, decision 
interdependence, and the history of rival extraction thus far.  Many times, CPR 
experiments incorporate complete and perfect information to simplify the design of 
complex adaptive resource systems.  However, this experimental study employed 
imperfect information in regards to the status of rival water levels, an important metric 
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for decisions regarding regulation avoidance and one in which MDEQ roughly provides 
producers in the MRVAA.  This required subjects in the regulatory treatments to update 
beliefs.  In this regard, subjects based their current and future extraction decisions on 
heuristic beliefs of the state of rival water levels. 
Future Research and Extensions 
A future research extension would be to have a better estimation of the geological 
dynamics specific to the MRVAA.  A GIS mapping of the aquifer would provide realistic 
parameter values to be incorporated into the experimental design.  This would inform 
regulators, as well as policymakers, more directly of how future regulations would impact 
whom and to what extent.    
Another extension would to experimentally test varying degrees of information 
about rival decisions ranging from perfect information to complete uncertainty.  Altering 
information levels may change individual producer’s beliefs of their rival’s decision 
strategies as well as their own.   
A third extension would be to derive a closed form solution of optimal paths from 
the Hamiltonian.  Accomplishing this would allow for direct comparisons of optimal and 
experimental paths in order to identify any sub-optimal deviations from the non-
cooperative equilibrium taken by experimental subjects.  These optimal paths would 
provide a stronger comparison to the unregulated state. 
The fourth extension would be to modify the regulatory trigger point in the 
experimental design.  The current trigger point was set when half of the producers 
experienced relatively low water levels (5.55 feet of available water).  This relatively lax 
trigger point could be perceived as a non-binding regulatory mechanism.  Raising the 
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trigger point, to potentially 50 feet, may incentivize significantly lower and sustained 
extraction rates within in the time horizon.  
A fifth potential extension would be to establish credible threats of regulation 
through local voting.  Within future experiments, after each production period, all 
producers would cast a vote and if 50% of the producers vote for regulation, then the 
regulatory policy would be implemented no matter where the water levels are in that 
current time period.  Therefore, the trigger mechanism is based on the majority of votes 
wanting regulation.  This may identify the formation of coalition of various types of 
producers in regards to recharge endowment (location), potentially among those most 
recharge disadvantaged. 
Lastly, an extension possibility would be to multiple crops and vary output prices 
across time.  Changing output prices allows for the examination of impacts on crop 
selection.  Therefore, if the profitability of water intensive crops (e.g., corn and soybeans) 
fall below less water intensive crops (e.g., cotton), this may result in reduced irrigation 
needs, in turn reducing water demand and lessening the dependence on costly regulation.            
Future research applying these six extensions would better inform all stakeholders 
in the Delta region.  Future extensions of this research would allow for higher efficiency 
in current water resource management, as well as leaving the aquifer in a better state for 








Archetti, M. (2009). Cooperation as a volunteer’s dilemma and the strategy of conflict in 
public goods games. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 22, 2192-2200. 
Arthur, J.K., (2001). Hydrogeology, model description, and flow analysis of the 
Mississippi River alluvial aquifer in northwestern Mississippi. U.S. Geological 
Survey Water-Resources Investigations Report 01-4035, p. 47.  
Barrett, J.W., & Skogerboe, G. (1980). Crop production functions and the allocation and 
use of irrigation water.  Agricultural Water Management, 3(1), 53-64. 
Beeson, V. & Coblentz, B. (2014). Irrigation Innovation. MAFES Discovers. Mississippi 
State University. Retrieved from 
http://mafes.msstate.edu/discovers/article.asp?id=4 
Blomquist, W., & Ostrom, E. (1985). Institutional capacity and the resolution of a 
commons dilemma. Review of Policy Research, 5(2), 383-394. 
Boswell, E., Cushing, E., Hosman, R. (1968). Quaternary Aquifers in the Mississippi 
Embayment. Geological Survey, United States Department of the Interior, 448-E. 
Brandon, H. (2011, February 10). Mississippi water permit regs aim for sustainability. 
Delta Farm Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.deltafarmpress.com/management/mississippi-water-permit-regs-aim-
sustainability 
Brozović, N., Sunding, D., & Zilberman, D. (2006). Optimal management of 
groundwater over space and time. In Frontiers in water resource economics (pp. 
109-135). Springer, Boston, MA. 
Brozović, N., Sunding, D. L., & Zilberman, D. (2010). On the spatial nature of the 
groundwater pumping externality. Resource and Energy Economics, 32(2), 154-
164. 
Casari, M., & Plott, C. R. (2003). Decentralized management of common property 
resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, 51(2), 217-247. 
 
78 
Coupe, R., Barlow, J., Capel, P. (2012). Complexity of human and ecosystem interactions 
in an agricultural landscape. Environmental Development, 4, 88-104. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics, 10:2 171-178.  
Gardner, R., Ostrom, E., & Walker, J. M. (1990). The nature of common-pool resource 
problems. Rationality and Society, 2(3), 335-358. 
Gardner, R., Moore, M. R., & Walker, J. (1997). Governing a Groundwater Commons: A 
Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law. Economic 
Inquiry, 35(2), 218-34.  
Gisser, M., & Sanchez, D. A. (1980). Competition versus optimal control in groundwater 
pumping. Water resources research, 16(4), 638-642. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248. 
Hardin, G. (1995). Living within limits: Ecology, economics, and population taboos. 
Oxford University Press. 
Henry, C., & Krutz, L. J. (2017, May 1). Surge irrigation information. Retrieved from 
https://www.uaex.edu/environment-
nature/water/Surge%20Irrigation%20Factsheet%202017.pdf 
Herr, A., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. M. (1997). An experimental study of time-
independent and time-dependent externalities in the commons. Games and 
Economic Behavior, 19(1), 77-96. 
Holt, C. A., Johnson, C. A., Mallow, C. A., & Sullivan, S. P. (2012). Water externalities: 
tragedy of the common canal. Southern Economic Journal, 78(4), 1142-1162. 
Kebede, H., Fisher, D., Sui, R., Reddy, K. (2014). Irrigation Methods and Scheduling in 
the Delta Region of Mississippi: Current Status and Strategies to Improve 
Irrigation Efficiency. American Journal of Plant Sciences. 5, 2917-2928.  
Keser, C., Gardner, R. (1999). Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common 
pool resource game.  International Journal of Game Theory, 28, 241-252. 
Kranz, W., Irmak, S., van Donk, S., Yonts, C., Martin, D. (2008). Irrigation Management 
for Corn. University of Nebraska-Lincoln Extension.  
Lewis, T. R., & Cowens, J. (1983). Cooperation in the commons: an application of 
repetitious rivalry. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, Department of 
Economics. 
Lloyd, W. F. (1833). Two lectures on the checks to population.  
 
79 
Loáiciga, H. A. (2004). Analytic game—theoretic approach to ground-water 
extraction. Journal of Hydrology, 297(1), 22-33.  
Madani, K. (2010). Game theory and water resources. Journal of Hydrology, 381, 225-
238. 
Madani, K., Dinar, A. (2012). Non-cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool 
resource management: Application to groundwater. Ecological Economics, 74, 
34-45.Ostrom, E., Walker, J. M., & Gardner, R. (1992). Covenants with and 
without a Sword: Self-governance Is Possible. American political science 
Review, 86(02), 404-417. 
McKee, J. (2011, January 6). Water wars – will they make it to the Mississippi delta? 
Delta Bohemian. Retrieved from http://deltabohemian.com/water-wars-
mississippi-delta/ 
Ostrom, E., & Gardner, R. (1993). Coping with asymmetries in the commons: self-
governing irrigation systems can work. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 7(4), 93-112. 
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., Policansky, D. (1999). Revisiting 
the commons: local lessons, global challenges. Science, 284, 278-282. 
Parks, R. W. (1967). Efficient estimation of a system of regression equations when 
disturbances are both serially and contemporaneously correlated. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, 62(318), 500-509. 
Peterson, J. M., & Ding, Y. (2005). Economic adjustments to groundwater depletion in 
the high plains: Do water-saving irrigation systems save water?. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87(1), 147-159. 
Pfeiffer, L., & Lin, C. Y. C. (2012). Groundwater pumping and spatial externalities in 
agriculture. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 64(1), 16-30. 
Ponce, V. (2006). Groundwater Utilization and Sustainability. Retrieved from 
http://groundwater.sdsu.edu 
Provencher, B., & Burt, O. (1993). The externalities associated with the common 
property exploitation of groundwater. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 24(2), 139-158. 
Seabright, P. (1993). Managing local commons: theoretical issues in incentive 
design. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(4), 113-134. 
Schnier, K. E. (2009). Spatial externalities and the common-pool resource 
mechanism. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70(1), 402-415. 
 
80 
Smith, S., Andersson, K., Cody, K., Cox, M., Ficklin, D. (2017). Responding to a 
Groundwater Crisis: The Effects of Self-Imposed Economic Incentives. Journal 
of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 4(4), 985-1023.   
Suter, J. F., Duke, J. M., Messer, K. D., & Michael, H. A. (2012). Behavior in a spatially 
explicit groundwater resource: Evidence from the lab. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, aas058. 
US Environmental Protection Agency. (2016). Renewable Fuel Standard Program. 
Retrieved (July, 11, 2016) from https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standard-
program 
Yazoo Mississippi Delta Joint Water Management District (YMD). (2006). Water 
Management Plan. Retrieved from 
http://www.ymd.org/pdfs/Water%20Mgmt%20Plan%20to%20DEQ%20Jan06.pd
f 
Yazoo Mississippi Delta Joint Water Management District (YMD) (2010). 2010 Crop 
Analysis. http://www.ymd.org/pdfs/YMD2010CropAnalysis.pdf  
Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., & Ostrom, E. (1990). Rent dissipation in a limited-access 
common-pool resource: Experimental evidence. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 19(3), 203-211. 
Walker, J. M., & Gardner, R. (1992). Probabilistic destruction of common-pool 
resources: Experimental evidence. The Economic Journal, 102(414), 1149-1161. 
Walker, J. M., Gardner, R., Herr, A., & Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective choice in the 
commons: Experimental results on proposed allocation rules and votes. The 
Economic Journal, 110(460), 212-234. 



























Mississippi State University requires Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol 
approval for all human subject experiments.  The finalized IRB approval to conduct 
human experiments is included in this appendix in addition to the attachments that 
include: a sample experimental session general announcement flyer, a sample sign-up 
sheet, an informed consent form, a sample payment receipt form, and the water game 




Sent Date: Wednesday, April 12, 2017 14:44:32 PM 
To: scw46@msstate.edu, jb928@msstate.edu, ktc76@msstate.edu Cc: 
Bcc: 
Subject: IRB Protocol Approved: IRB-17-198, Steven Wilhelms Message: 
IRB has approved the protocol with the following details. 
Protocol ID: IRB-17-198 
Principal Investigator: Steven Wilhelms 
Department: Agricultural Economics 
Protocol Title: Mitigating a Commons Dilemma: Agricultural Water Use in the Mississippi Delta 
Review Type: EXEMPT 
Approval Date: April 12, 2017 
Expiration Date: April 12, 2018 
To access your approval documents, log into myProtocol and click on the protocol number to open the 
approved study. Your official approval letter can be found under the Event History section. For non- 
exempt approved studies, all stamped documents (e.g., consent, recruitment) can be found in the 
Attachment section and are labeled accordingly. 
If you have any questions that the HRPP can assist you in answering, please do not hesitate to contact us at 
irb@research.msstate.edu or 662.325.3994. 






Economic Experiment General Announcement  
 
Don’t pass up this excellent opportunity to try out your economic decision skills in a 
water extraction choice experiment resulting in earning a considerable amount of real 
$money$.  Earnings per experiment are expected to range from $20 to $30, plus a  
$5 show-up bonus.  
 
Who?  
All agricultural economics, economics, forestry, agronomy, plant soil science, 
accounting, and finance students with a junior, senior or graduate standing.  
  
When?  
Experiments will be conducted the Week of April 17th - April 20th and the Week of 
April 24th - April 28th at 3:30pm each day and last roughly 90 minutes.  
  
Where?  
Sessions will be held in Experimental Teaching Laboratory (Room 1), Lloyd-Ricks-
Watson Building.  
  
To sign up, contact Chris Wilhelms by email scw46@msstate.edu.  You may sign up 
once per experiment.   
  
If you have any questions or to inquire about available sessions please contact:  
  
Chris Wilhelms scw46@msstate.edu  
Lloyd-Ricks-Watson, Room 02  
(662) 325-7983  
  
Dr. Kalyn T. Coatney  
coatney@agecon.msstate.edu       
Lloyd-Ricks-Watson, Room 365    
(662) 325-7983 
 








Sign-Up Sheet for Water Extraction Choice Experiment 
Please print your name below if you wish to participate in an experiment sponsored by 
the Department of Agricultural Economics. By participating you will have the 
opportunity to earn a considerable amount of money. The experiment will last 
approximately 1 to 1½ hours.  
  
Confidentiality  
All Consent forms, payment records, and data is kept confidential.  Subjects are 
identified by number only in stored data.  Please note that these records will be held by 
a state entity and therefore are subject to disclosure if required by law.  Research 
information may be shared with the MSU Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the 
Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP).  
  
Voluntary Participation  
Please understand that your participation is voluntary.  Your refusal to participate 
will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  You 
may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits.   
  
Questions  
If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact Mr. 
Steven Christopher Wilhelms at 662-325-7983   
  
For questions regarding your rights as a research participant, or to discuss problems, 
express concerns or complaints, request information, or offer input, please feel free to 
contact the MSU Research Compliance Office by phone at 01-662-325-3994, by e-mail 
at irb@research.msstate.edu, or on the web at 
http://orc.msstate.edu/humansubjects/participant/.  
 
This sheet is for the experiment to be held on April 17th at 3:30 pm in Experimental 
Teaching Laboratory (Room 1) Lloyd-Ricks-Watson Building. 
 
SIGN UP SHEET 
 Name Email Major Classification 
1     
2     
…     
18     
Alternate     
 




Informed Consent Form for Participation in Research for Exempt Research 
 
  
Title of Research Study: Mitigating a Commons Dilemma: Agricultural Water Use 
in the Mississippi Delta  
  
Researcher(s): Steven Christopher Wilhelms and Dr. Kalyn T. Coatney, Mississippi 
State University, Department of Agricultural Economics      
  
Procedures: You will be asked to participate in a water extraction game.  You will 
participate in an producer choice experiment in which you will be an producer 
choosing how much groundwater to extract to produce an output.  In this role, you 
will participate in one practice round to familiarize yourself with the choice 
experiment.  You will then participate in 50 production rounds where you will make 
an extraction decision within each round that will determine the majority of your final 
payoff for the market experiment today.  Your participation in this experiment will 
last approximately 1 to 1 ½ hours.  At the end of the experimental session today, your 
total payoffs will be determined, which will be added to the initial show-up fee, and 
you will be paid in cash.  
  
Questions: If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to 
contact Mr. Steven Christopher Wilhelms at 662-325-7983 or scw46@msstate.edu  
  
Voluntary Participation: Please understand that your participation is voluntary.  
Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you 
are otherwise entitled.  You may discontinue your participation at any time 
without penalty or loss of benefits.   
  
  
Please take all the time you need to read through this document and decide 
whether you would like to participate in this research study.  
  
If you decide to participate, your completion of the research procedures indicates 
your consent.  Please keep this form for your records.  
  
*The MSU HRPP has granted an exemption for this research. Therefore, a formal 









DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 










          (please print name)  
  
MSU ID #:___________________________________  
  
HOME ADDRESS:       _______________________________________  
 (Permanent)          (please print)  
         
                         _______________________________________  
          City                State          Zip  
  
  
I have participated in a Water Extraction Game Study at Mississippi State 
University conducted by the Department of Agricultural Economics.  
  
I received $______________ in the form of a Cash  
  
   
 from _____________________________.  
         (Signature of Experiment Director)  
  
   
______________________________________  
(Signature of Participant)  
 
Figure A.5 Experiment participation payment form 
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Thank you all for your attendance today! 
 
We appreciate you taking the time out of your day to contribute invaluable data 
towards our research. 
Please take this time to turn off cell phones or set to vibrate if you are expecting an 
extremely important call or text message. Thank you for complying with our request. 
i.        The Role of an Experimental Subject and Earnings 
 You will be an producer who decides on the quantity of water to extract for 
application toward your output within a production period. 
 Your earnings for each period are determined by the difference between the value of 
the total output and total costs of production. 
 You will be engaged in numerous periods of production. 
 Your total earnings for the experiment today will equal the sum of your payoffs from 
each production period. 
 Your earnings are recorded as a fictitious currency called tokens. 
 At the conclusion of the experiment today, you will be paid in dollars at an 
undisclosed exchange rate. 
ii. Experimental Setting and Payoff Description 
 The experiment you are engaged in today focuses on producers’ water extraction 
decisions from an aquifer over time.   
 Aquifer Characteristics: The aquifer is largely recharged at a single location and 
generally flows in a common direction.   
 Producers extract groundwater in each period to produce an arbitrary farm output.  
Increasing the extraction of water increases total output resulting in increased period 
revenues.   







 Producer Interrelationships: Producers are located along the directional flow of the 
aquifer.  The cumulative extraction by upstream producers necessarily reduces the 
recharge rate of downstream producers.  The impact on recharge is the greatest by 
each producer’s immediate upstream neighbor.  However, the extraction of 
downstream producers does not impact the recharge rate of upstream producers. 
 If extraction is greater than the recharge rate, the producer’s water level necessarily 
declines.   
 If a producer’s water level decreases, more energy is required to lift the groundwater 
which will result in higher production costs.   
 If extraction costs increase relative to a constant revenue, then producer profit 
necessarily declines across periods. 
 If a producer either runs out of water or chooses not to extract, then that producer’s 
returns are that of no extraction. 
 Therefore, individual producer period earnings are determined by i) the individual 
producer’s water extraction, ii) the upstream producer(s) water extraction rates, as 
well as iii) the history of all producers’ extraction. 
iii.  Experimental Procedures 
 You will compete in 3 separate rounds today.  Initially, you will be randomly 
positioned within the aquifer where you will stay throughout the entire experiment. 
 You will observe that each round consists of 50 production periods.   
 You will choose the amount of water extracted from the aquifer in each period.  
Potential extraction choices range from 0-10.  Choosing 0 will result in the minimum 
output yield (dryland returns) and 10 is the maximum allowable extraction resulting 
in the maximum output yield. 
  
Figure A.6 (continued) 
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Table 1. Max extraction and Resulting Impacts Table 2. Reduced Extraction and Resulting Impacts 
 
Table 3. Producer in Position 6’s History of Choices, Impacts, and Profits 
 
 The higher extraction choices necessarily results in additional period revenues than 
lower extraction choices.  Your extraction choice may be rounded to the nearest 
hundredth of a decimal (e.g. 2.7 or 7.3). 
 You will also observe in both Table 1 and 2 how upstream producers’ extraction 
choices directly impact your recharge rate which also indirectly impacts your 
remaining available water level.  
Figure A.6 (continued) 
 
 
EXTRACTION CHOICES EXTRACTION CHOICES
FARMER POSITION FARMER POSITION
Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 10 10 10 10 10 10 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 10 10 10
RETURNS RETURNS
FARMER POSITION FARMER POSITION
Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 6005 6005 6005 6005 6005 6005 1 2387.61 2387.61 2387.61 6005 6005 6005
RECHARGE RECHARGE
FARMER POSITION FARMER POSITION
Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 10.00 8.50 7.75 7.25 6.88 6.58 1 10 9.78 9.66 9.59 8.28 7.61
WATER LEVEL WATER LEVEL
FARMER POSITION FARMER POSITION
Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 100 93.69 92.95 92.46 92.09 91.79 1 100 94.94 94.83 94.76 93.45 92.78
COSTS COSTS
FARMER POSITION FARMER POSITION
Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 260.00 323.12 330.51 335.43 339.13 342.08 1 238.75 259.08 259.25 312.40 325.52 332.24
PROFIT PROFIT
FARMER POSITION FARMER POSITION
Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 Time Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 5745.00 5681.88 5674.49 5669.57 5665.87 5662.92 1 2148.86 2128.53 2128.36 5692.60 5679.48 5672.76












t e 1t e 2t e 3t e 4t e 5t e 6t g 6 (e jt ) S 6t π 6 t Σπ 6 t
1 10 10 10 10 10 10 6.58 91.79 5662.92 5662.92
2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 10 9.49 89.66 5641.62 11304.53
3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 8.7 8.77 82.92 5511.95 16816.49
4 4.2 4.9 5.3 6.4 8.9 9.4 7.61 73.51 5478.03 22294.52
5 7.2 8.4 8.7 9.3 9.7 7.9 6.88 64.36 5243.15 27537.67
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 Table 3 will report the history of your: extraction decision, recharge rate, remaining 
available water level, per period earnings, and a running tally of those earnings.  This 
will also include all other producers’ extraction choices in order to map out the 
history of all producers’ extraction choices and the resulting relative impacts.   
 Notice that per period earnings are decreasing after each time period.  This is a direct 
result of the difference between the total value of your outputs from extraction and 
decreasing remaining available water.  Therefore as water levels decrease, the costs of 
extraction (due to need for additional energy to lift the water) increases and profits 
decrease (due to the relationship between a constant revenue and increasing 
extraction costs). 
 You may also enter an extraction choice less than the remaining available water in 
any time period to avoid completely running out of water.  However, you will NOT 
be allowed to enter an extraction decision exceeding the available water level in any 
respective production period.  If either you run out of water or choose not to extract, 
you will receive dryland returns.   
 Once completely out of water, you will not be allowed to make another extraction 
choice for the remainder of the round. 



















 At the beginning of each round, the moderator will instruct the producers to make 
their first time period’s extraction choice. 
 You will be given 30 seconds to enter and submit your extraction choice for each 
time period.  Enter your extraction choice in the box to the right of ‘Extraction 
Choice,” then click the box next to ‘OK’ to submit your extraction choice. 
 Once all producers have entered and submitted their respective extraction choices, a 
table depicting the history of all producers’ extraction choices and relative impacts 
will be updated and the next production period begins. 
 Upon completion of all 50 production periods, the next round will begin.  Please wait 
for the moderator to cue participants to begin making and submitting your next 
round’s first period extraction choice. 
 You will repeat this process until the completion of 3 rounds. 
 
Figure A.6 (continued) 
 












t e 1t e 2t e 3t e 4t e 5t e 6t g 6 (e jt ) S 6t π 6 t Σπ 6 t
1 10 10 10 10 10 10 6.58 91.79 5662.92 5662.92
2 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 10 9.49 89.66 5641.62 11304.53
3 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 8.7 8.77 82.92 5511.95 16816.49
4 4.2 4.9 5.3 6.4 8.9 9.4 7.61 73.51 5478.03 22294.52





At this time does anyone have any questions? 
- Before beginning the experiment that determines your earnings, you will 
complete 1 practice round consisting of 5 production periods that do not impact 
your earnings for the experiment today.  The extraction choices will not be timed 
within the practice round to ensure all participants understand fully what to 
expect in each successive production period.  
- Please do not talk to other subjects or look on their computer screens during the 
experiment. 
- Remember, there are not right or wrong decisions, only those you believe that 
are in your best interest. 
- A reminder, you may enter extraction choices rounded to the nearest tenth of a 
decimal if you like and your extraction choice may NOT exceed the remaining 
available water level in any round. 
- Please do not hesitate to ask questions during the practice round. 
Let’s begin the Practice Round! 
- Please click ‘OK’ on the bottom right of the screen on your desktop. 
- Since the practice round is not timed, please wait patiently for all participants to 
submit their respective extraction decision.  The screen will automatically 
progress to the next time period when all participants have submitted their 
extraction choices. 
- At this time, please make your first period extraction choice. 
**[Upon completion of the practice round]** 
- Are there any questions before starting the rounds that determine your 
earnings? 
- We are now beginning of the rounds that determine your earnings begin with 
Round 1. 
- Let’s Begin. 
Figure A.6 (continued) 
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REGULATION ADDENDUM:  
When HALF the producers reach a water level of 5.55, this will trigger the 
LIMITED-USE regulatory policy.  Upon implementation of the limited-use 
policy, all producers’ MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE extraction rate will be 
REDUCED to (5.55) until all producers’ stock levels have reached the maximum 
level. 
 I will inform you privately when this policy has been triggered by pausing your 
timer for the respective period and dropping off a slip of paper informing you of 
the implementation of the regulatory policy.  You may then enter any extraction 
rate between 0 to 5.55, but remember that you cannot extract more than the 
available water (e.g. regulation has been triggered, you choose to extract 5.55, 
but your available water level is 2.48.  The program will allow only 2.48).  I 
notify you that the policy has been lifted.  
 NOTE: The program is NOT hard-coded to limit your extraction to 5.55!  
This implies that if regulation has been triggered and even if your available 
water level is greater than 5.55, PLEASE only submit an extraction decision 
between 0 to 5.55 (MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE EXTRACTION = 5.55) until 
policy is lifted.  This will keep the integrity of the data and results. 
 










When HALF the producers reach a water level of 5.55, this will trigger the 
MORATORIUM regulatory policy.  Upon implementation of the moratorium 
policy, all producers will NOT be able to extract any water until all producers’ 
stock levels have reached the maximum level.  This will result in all subjects’ 
payoffs (profit) to be 750 tokens until the policy has been lifted. 
 I will inform you privately when this policy has been triggered by pausing your 
timer for the respective period and dropping off a slip of paper informing you 
that the regulatory policy has been implemented.  You will then enter “0” for 
your extraction choice until I notify you that the policy has been lifted.  
 NOTE: The program is NOT hard-coded to ensure you enter “0!”  This 
implies that if regulation has been triggered, the program will allow you to still 
enter any extraction choices, BUT PLEASE enter “0” until the policy is lifted.  
This will keep the integrity of the data and results. 
 
Figure A.8 Experimental regulation addendum for moratorium treatment 
  
 
